A New Conception of War: John Boyd, the U.S. Marines, and Maneuver Warfare by Rielage, Dale C. & Brown, Ian T.
Naval War College Review 
Volume 73 
Number 4 Autumn 2020 Article 12 
2020 
A New Conception of War: John Boyd, the U.S. Marines, and 
Maneuver Warfare 
Dale C. Rielage 
Ian T. Brown 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review 
Recommended Citation 
Rielage, Dale C. and Brown, Ian T. (2020) "A New Conception of War: John Boyd, the U.S. Marines, and 
Maneuver Warfare," Naval War College Review: Vol. 73 : No. 4 , Article 12. 
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/12 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval 
War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu. 
 1 7 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
A New Conception of War: John Boyd, the U.S. 
Marines, and Maneuver Warfare, by Ian T. 
Brown. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Univ. 
Press, 2018. 311 pages. Available for download at 
usmcu.edu/. Free.
There is more folklore associated with 
John Boyd than perhaps any other 
military thinker of the last fifty years. 
Maverick fighter pilot, iconoclast, 
conceiver of the now-ubiquitous “OODA 
loop,” Boyd never fit neatly in anyone’s 
mold. Knife fighting his way through the 
Pentagon bureaucracy, Boyd reshaped 
a generation of U.S. fighter aircraft, 
influenced key acquisition programs, 
and changed the way American military 
officers thought about combat—amass-
ing along the way a distinguished 
list of senior enemies. His influence, 
while profound, usually was indirect 
and always difficult to characterize.
It is ironic that Boyd had his most 
sweeping impact outside both aviation 
and the Air Force that he served for thirty 
years. Maneuver warfare—the defining 
characteristic of Marine Corps combat 
doctrine for three decades—was in no 
small part a product of Boyd’s thought. 
While Boyd has been the subject of 
several books, in A New Conception of 
War Marine major Ian Brown provides 
the first complete account of Boyd and 
the Marine Corps. In the process, he 
crafts a case study in military institutional 
change that deserves wide attention.
Brown asserts that the road from Boyd’s 
ideas to maneuver warfare doctrine 
required four essential and distinct 
elements: need, idea, internal advocacy, 
and leadership. First, the Marine Corps 
of the 1970s and ’80s recognized that it 
needed a new institutional approach. The 
end of the Vietnam War left the Corps 
struggling to find its way in a world 
newly refocused on great-power competi-
tion with the Soviet Union. Advances 
in military technology had rendered 
familiar Marine Corps operational 
approaches questionable. Not inter-
ested in being relegated to constabulary 
operations outside the main fight, the 
Corps was looking for a way to leverage 
what it believed were its distinctive 
strengths in support of high-end combat.
The second essential element was Boyd 
and his ideas. Brown, like all writers who 
have sought to capture the essence of 
Boyd’s thinking, struggles to capture the 
shifting intellectual journey that marked 
Boyd’s life. Boyd’s seminal work was a 
briefing entitled “Patterns of Conflict.” 
Delivered over the course of hours, each 
presentation expressed Boyd’s thinking at 
that moment. By never putting his ideas 
fully into print, Boyd could (and routinely 
did) deflect criticism by remaining the 
sole arbiter of his meaning. Nonetheless, 
Brown manages to capture the sweep of 
Boyd’s ideas. Readers familiar with the 
common simplistic summary of Boyd’s 
observation, orientation, decision, and 
action (OODA) loop model will be 
intrigued by the full scope of this idea 
and how Boyd extended its implications 
to the breadth of human conflict.
However profound, Boyd’s ideas would 
not have had influence without advocacy 
within the Marine Corps. Brown excels in 
describing the small group of influencers 
who became the key internal advocates 
for Boyd. Each occupied a sweet spot in 
the Corps hierarchy: senior enough to be 
credible, but not so senior that he could 
not critique the service; experienced 
enough to see the need for change; 
knowledgeable and confident in his own 
thinking; and positioned at an overlap 
between the Corps and sources of outside 
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ideas. One key influencer, Colonel 
Michael Wyly, came to occupy key posi-
tions in the Marine Corps educational 
establishment, where Boyd’s ideas crystal-
lized into maneuver warfare doctrine.
The Corps’s internal advocates eventually 
found senior leadership willing to push 
the service in a new direction, most 
importantly General Al Gray. In 1989, 
Commandant Gray issued Fleet Marine 
Force Manual 1. Entitled simply Warfight-
ing, FMFM-1 made maneuver warfare the 
key defining characteristic of the Corps’s 
operational approach; it has remained 
so for thirty years. It is significant to 
note, however, that the senior leaders 
who adopted maneuver warfare did 
not become converts as senior officers; 
rather, they had become interested in 
these ideas years before, ascended the 
ranks, then moved to implement their 
vision—an observation consistent with 
other studies of institutional reform.
The story of how a rogue Air Force 
fighter pilot shaped the core ideas of 
the Marine Corps is a case study in how 
militaries learn and change. Many similar 
case studies oversimplify this messy and 
imperfect process, creating a clean nar-
rative of progressive heroes and resistant 
villains. Brown avoids this trap—a success 
all the more impressive given the strong 
opinions that still surround Boyd. In so 
doing, Brown has produced a book that 
will take its place alongside Rosen’s Win-
ning the Next War and Bergerson’s The 
Army Gets an Air Force as a foundational 
study of military institutional change.
A New Conception of War skillfully brings 
an extraordinary, historic episode to a 
new generation of Marine Corps leaders 
and, in a larger context, to any leader 
who is contemplating leading change.
DALE C. RIELAGE
The Mayaguez Crisis, Mission Command, and 
Civil-Military Relations, by Christopher J. Lamb. 
Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018. 
330 pages. Available for download at jcs.mil/. 
Free.
Khmer Rouge forces boarded and took 
control of the U.S.-registered merchant 
vessel Mayaguez on 12 May 1975, 
then released the crew three days later. 
Coming just two weeks after the fall of 
Saigon, the move was considered a bra-
zen challenge to the U.S. commitment 
in the region. Ultimately the American 
response resulted in the release of 
the crew and their ship, at the cost of 
forty-one American servicemen killed 
and dozens wounded. Christopher J. 
Lamb, a distinguished research fellow at 
National Defense University, has written 
a thorough and evenhanded history of 
the crisis, demonstrating a command of 
existing literature and original sources.
In the immediate wake of the invasion 
and collapse of South Vietnam, the 
overwhelming motivation among 
decision makers was to demonstrate 
American resolve. President Ford and 
Henry Kissinger—the latter wearing 
both the national security advisor (NSA) 
and Secretary of State hats—were fully 
in charge, but Secretary of Defense 
James Schlesinger, Deputy NSA Brent 
Scowcroft, White House chief of staff 
Donald Rumsfeld, and other key actors 
all agreed with Ford and Kissinger that 
forceful action was necessary to reassure 
allies, to show Beijing that Washington 
would remain engaged in the region, 
and above all to deter Pyongyang. North 
Korean aggression was a real concern, 
as was a repeat of the 1968 Pueblo 
incident or the lesser-known EC-121 
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